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The Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyer JS Maya fires an SM-3 Block IIA missile. (courtesy of JMSDF)

Recently, the South Korean government made the decision to include the SM-3 — an interception missile ill-suited to defend against North Korean nuclear and missile threats — on its next-generation Aegis-equipped warships.

This amounts to a declaration that it intends to acquire the capability to intercept missiles launched by North Korea or China toward Guam or Okinawa — islands with US military bases on them — based on its “right of collective self-defense” powers.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration needs to immediately stop pursuing a project like this, which would signify a sea change in South Korea’s security policy. It also needs to initiate a frank public discussion on whether these capabilities actually align with the national interest.

At a defense acquisition program promotion committee meeting on Friday, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) reviewed and approved a basic strategy for pursuing the adoption of ship-based guided missiles for ballistic missile interception.

Specifically, the plan involves spending 803.9 billion won (US$579.4 million) between 2025 and 2030 to purchase around 40 SM-3 missiles via foreign military sales and include them in its Jeongjo the Great-class Aegis destroyers. With a displacement of 8,200 tons, these next-generation warships are regarded as a source of national pride.

In its latest improved model, the SM-3 is a weapon designed generally to intercept enemy ballistic missiles at the “intermediate stage” at altitudes between 100 and 1,000 km. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has long kept this weapon on its own Aegis destroyers to intercept potential North Korean ballistic missiles arriving over the East Sea.

The range of a missile can typically be estimated as being roughly 2.5 to three times its maximum altitude. Based on this, the SM-3 may be viewed as suited to intercepting intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) fired at Japan’s main islands, Okinawa, or Guam rather than the short-range missiles that North Korea might launch toward the South.

Indeed, the North has repeatedly shown its capability of targeting the South with 600 mm super-large multiple rocket launchers and nuclear warheads attached to short-range missiles with irregular flight patterns, such as the KN-23, which has been called the “North Korean Iskander.”

The SM-3, which costs around 20 billion won (US$14 million) apiece, is essentially useless against these direct threats to South Korea. Nevertheless, the DAPA has insisted that the weapon is meant to “intercept North Korean missiles at the intermediate stage in airspace over the Korean Peninsula.”

In 2015 and 2016, the Japanese government cited “ballistic missile attacks targeting Guam and Hawaii” as an example of an instance that would justify Japan mobilizing its military in self-defense. The SM-3 is a weapon designed for such an attack.  In fact, because the missiles are made to protect US territory it’s only a matter of time before they are integrated into the US’ missile defense system. 

Korea’s plan to procure SM-3s is not something that should be pursued blindly, without debate or consultation. The Yoon administration needs to pause and explain its actions to the people and offer a justification and reasoning that the people can accept.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]